The South China Sea dispute is based on both maritime as well as territorial claims. The Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal, and the Pratas Islands are the four contested geographic features in the South China Sea, with the Paracel Islands, claimed by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam and the Spratly Islands, claimed in their entirety by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and in part by the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei being the most hotly contested. This maritime dispute has at its roots in Beijing’s contentious ‘nine-dash line’, that was Beijing’s cartographic assertion submitted to the UN in 2009. The controversial line lays claims on the maritime and territorial features that are in compliance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, its bully-like actions have led to discord in the region. There have been overlapping claims in the South China Sea with China seeking to become the hegemon in the disputed regional topography.

The South China Sea Arbitration

There are six nations that contest all or parts of the oil and gas rich South China Sea, which has led to a series of confrontations between the Dragon and others over the competing claims.

The Philippines in January 2013 put forth a case against China’s belligerent activities and expansive claims in the SCS. An arbitral tribunal was constituted for the hearing of the case under the UNCLOS and final decision in 2016 was in Philippines’ favour; the resource rights in the South China Sea had to be clarified. China’s contentious nine-dash line became the subject of disapproval and the tribunal ruled against it, clearly stating that China was claiming historic rights to the resources within the jurisdiction of its aforementioned nine-dash but in actuality, these claims were nullified with China becoming a signatory of the UNCLOS in 1996 due to its discordancy with the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of other coastal states.

The tribunal also ruled that the 200-nautical-mile EEZ entitlements of the Philippines and, by conclusion, the other coastal states in the region, are unfettered by the nine-dash line or any claimed EEZ in the Spratly Islands.

China denounced the decision as “null and void” having “no binding force,” it largely kept to its letter if not its spirit in the first year after the award. The United States and its allies, members of ASEAN and India directly or indirectly pressured Beijing to accept the ruling and comply with the UNCLOS. Another reason could have been China’s disinterest in direct confrontation in the region.

China’s Outright Claims Over the South China Sea

Beijing’s venture into the disputed South China Sea has been a part and parcel of its long-term strategy to establish its hegemony over the near and far regions and expand and deepen its sphere of influence, both overland and in the seas. Recently, the dragon’s firing of medium-range missiles into the SCS and its ever-increasing military exercises is an avowal in order to show its sovereignty over the disputed waters.

Even though its untoward claims have no legal basis, as pointed out by Hague Tribunal, which is by and large ignored and disobeyed by China, does not stop it from emerging as a formidable trouble-fomenting power in the South China Sea. What started in the guise of a cooperative mechanism for engaging with the countries in the periphery of the disputed SCS has turned into brazen bullying by Beijing.

Historically, post one-year anniversary of the UNCLOS tribunal’s ruling, as international attention faded, China started strengthening its claims and encroaching upon the EEZs of the coastal states; deepening the purview of its maritime claims and increasing its military and naval presence apart from objecting to the presence of US navigation and laws of free movement. It was greatly engaged in consolidating its grand and objectionable territorial claims engaging in reclamation of physical geographical features on which lay its belligerent claims. Its militarisation of the region and installations at Mischief Reef through naval and aerial facilities and setting up of artificial islands has been a well-known factor.

Beijing has been an aggressive bully in the region trying to establish rules and laws that favour its grandiose plans. It has always maintained that it has full control over the region and has stakes and claims, as in the case of its assertion on a recent White Paper – “China exercises its national sovereignty to build infrastructure and deploy necessary defensive capabilities on the islands and reefs in the South China Sea.”

Conclusion

Beijing through its deplorable actions has been able to outrightly build a forceful maritime presence in the South China Sea, strengthening its surveillance and intelligence capabilities; its aerial capabilities have also helped it to gain a strong foothold over the region, thus, bringing it closer to the realisation of its broad strategic goals of hegemony of the region, sans any respect for the laws of the sea or the international rules-based order. The other adversaries have also been subdued by China’s overwhelming presence in the region and even, the US credibility, action and capability has been undermined with Chinese sovereign control over the contested territory being somewhat fait accompli. Chinese downright assertions over the South China Sea have antagonised the neighbouring states with the ASEAN being virtually helpless in the face of adversity that Beijing has thrown on to them. Moreover, in the present scenario in a world ravaged by COVID-19, it is difficult to control the bully and prevent it from infringing on the rights of other rightful contenders of the South China Sea resources.

References:

Council on Foreign Relations. (n.d.). Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea. Council on Foreign Relations.

Kumar, A., & Chari, S. (2020, September 6). China creating a flashpoint in South China Sea. Sunday Guardian Live.

Kuok, L. (2019). How China’s actions in the South China Sea undermine the Rule of Law. Global China.

Tsirbas, M. (2016, June 2). What Does the Nine-Dash Line Actually Mean? The Diplomat.

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Though there has been a lack of political enthusiasm, the common threat of irking China and structural issues that have acted as obstacles for blossoming Indo-Taiwanese relations, Taiwan has engaged silently diplomatically in India. PM Narendra Modi and President Tsai Ing-wen, have engaged in furthering the bilateral relationship.

Contextualising the Indo-Taiwanese Relationship

The Indo-Taiwanese relations were almost non-existent for more than four decades after the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was recognised by India. Marking the beginning of their ‘unofficial’ ties,  in 1992, the Taiwan External Trade Development Council (TAITRA) set up a liaison office in Mumbai and, in 1995, India opened its representative office in Taipei and named it the India-Taipei Association (ITA) for economic engagement. In a month, Taiwan opened its office in New Delhi and called it the Taipei Economic and Cultural Centre (TECC). Now, the TECC offices are operational in Chennai, Kolkata, and Mumbai. Although they were not formal diplomatic missions, they do function as de-facto representatives of their respective governments and carry out activities like issuing of visas, carrying out trade and economic relations and facilitating people-to-people contacts. This was the beginning of bettering bilateral relations between India and Taiwan in the sphere of trade and commerce, development and research, science and technology, education, people-to-people contacts, and other related fields and thus, in the post Cold-War period, this marked an important watershed moment in the history of Indo-Taiwanese relationship. This was a pointer towards India’s ‘Look East Policy’, enunciated by the then Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao and was a marker of Taiwan’s pragmatic diplomacy.

Taiwan’s ‘pragmatic diplomacy’ is also known as ‘flexible diplomacy’ and ‘substantive diplomacy’ and focuses on enhancing its international profile and facilitating its external engagements by using ‘unofficial’ and ‘non-diplomatic’ channels in the broader economic and cultural arenas, without attempting conventional state-to-state diplomacy, so as not to invite ire from the PRC. New Delhi, in this context, has emerged as a significant factor for Taiwan’s substantive diplomatic practices. Given their shared concerns vis-à-vis China and the commonality of their democratic values, especially during the current strategic uncertainty, this seems like the perfect ripe moment to enhance relations between the two.

In 2014, Taiwan’s representative to India had attended PM Modi’s swearing-in ceremony, and in 2016, India carefully well thought-out sending a representative to President Tsai’s inauguration but eventually decided against it. Most countries, including India, have found it challenging to balance the political and strategic implications of fostering closer relations with Taiwan due to the uncertainty of China’s reaction, leading to a complex diplomatic maze. In this context, Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy (NSP) under Tsai Ing-wen seeks to expand links with countries across South and Southeast Asia with a great emphasis on building economic, investment and people-to-people ties, as well as a greater focus on India especially while New Delhi “acts east”. Given the swaying relationship between India and Mainland China, it is practical for India to shift towards greater stress on soft balancing by cultivating a fruitful relationship with Taiwan. The Indian government’s ‘Act East Policy’ provides for greater engagement between India and Southeast Asia, making Taiwan important for India’s future economic growth.

In terms of increasing economic and commercial engagement, the TECC and the ITA formalized an MoU in 2017 on the “Promotion of Industry Collaboration”, preceded by twenty-one MoUs signed earlier that year by Taiwan’s Chinese National Federation of Industries and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry. In 2018, the first India-Taiwan Trade Forum was convened in Taipei with the Taipei World Trade Center inaugurating its New Delhi office in conjunction with the debut of the Taiwan Expo (a business exposition) in South Asia over the summer of 2018 with New Delhi serving as its inaugural venue. Despite all these developments on the economic front, there have been domestic and structural problems in formalising the relationship, especially due to New Delhi’s position on acknowledging the ‘One-China policy’. New Delhi has overall remained ambiguous on the matter and the investment and trade have remained relatively modest but there have been efforts to increase investment by Taiwanese firms in India and notable joint initiatives and manufacturing clusters have been proposed under the ‘Make in India’ campaign.

Upgrading the Relationship: QUAD Angle

The need of the hour for India is focusing on a practical and long term pragmatic approach for fomenting better ties with Taiwan. We have to strategically balance the ‘One-China policy’ of Mainland China (based on one country, two systems model) and cultivating a beneficial and normal relationship with Taipei. New Delhi should not use Taiwan as a pressure point or Achilles Heel against the PRC as this hampers India’s goals and Taiwan’s development. The focal point for bettering the Indo-Taiwanese relationship should be based on enhancing people-to-people, cultural and business exchanges rather than focusing on the government-to-government gimmicks. Education, tourism and technological innovations can leverage the relationship. India should actively engage with Taiwanese NGOs to create an impact over the coming years and focus on roping in an international networking capacity. Small and medium-sized enterprises too can act as significant job creation initiatives and serve as great vehicles to exchange knowledge and human capital. Taiwan can also help in meeting India’s agricultural modernisation needs and its recent support during the pandemic in healthcare facilities is a pointer in the direction of up-gradation of the relationship in a pragmatic understanding. This soft power diplomacy through developmental assistance, cultural, healthcare, academic and tourist exchanges will surely benefit and give a thrust to long term robust India-Taiwan relations.

There have been under-utilised opportunities in the bilateral relationship. New Delhi needs to engage in proper policy approach to benefit most from a healthy relationship with the core area of the Chinese economy. The reshaping of the relationship with Taiwan has not only been a prerogative of New Delhi, the other three members of the QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue): USA, Australia and Japan have also upgraded their relations with Taipei.

Taiwan is significant for the QUAD countries as it is the core area that can be used to deter Chinese aggression due to its strategic location and partnership with the QUAD countries would act as a diplomatic weapon for both parties against the belligerent Dragon’s ever-rising provocations. Moreover, it is an important source of information on China, as evidenced in the case of the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, the QUAD needs to protect Taiwan from diplomatic isolation and help it develop its military and defensive capabilities while also providing it opportunities for investment in a safe and incentive-based environment in the QUAD so that they can safely relocate their economic and investment ventures from Mainland China without incurring losses.

Conclusion

India needs to act in a strategic manner and shed its inhibitions and self-imposed restraint on engaging with Taiwan. The bilateral relationship is extremely rewarding if managed appropriately by both parties. They have to act more decisively and New Delhi has to formally acknowledge Taiwan as a development partner and the role it can play in steering the direction of Indo-Taiwanese relationship. It is an opportune moment, also thus for the QUAD to recognise Taiwan as a reliable partner and counter China’s growing footprint in South Asia that it wants to establish its hegemony over, through its bellicose and pugnacious ways.

References:

Karackattu, J. T. (2019). The Case for a Pragmatic India-Taiwan Partnership. Carnegie India.

Nagao, S. (2020, August 2). The Quad must strengthen and support Taiwan. Sunday Guardian Live.

Singh, D. T. (2019). The New Southbound Policy and India-Taiwan Relations. Vivekananda International Foundation.

Tien-Sze, F. (2014). Taiwan’s Relations with India: Issues and Trends. China Report.

Times Now Digital. (2020, October 10). Quad and beyond: Is it time for India to take a tougher stance on Tibet and Taiwan?

Featured Image Source: Google Images | Image by: Reuters

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Due to the globalisation and liberalisation of global economies coupled with the rapid advancement in science and communication technologies, there has been an intensification of their socio-economic, political and cultural ties with their countries of origin. Diasporas have attained due importance at the international level as well as in the domestic political and economic affairs of home countries in the present scenario. They have started acting as an ‘inevitable link’ between their home and host lands resulting in major political and economic implications for both.

Diaspora as a Tool of Diplomacy in India’s Foreign Policy

The use of diaspora as a tool of diplomacy in Indian Foreign Policy is a relatively new phenomenon. The Indian diaspora is a major component of these concomitant worldwide and has increasingly become more influential over India’s foreign policy, becoming a highly strategic asset for India in the recent decades. India has been making concerted efforts to engage and leverage upon its diaspora estimated to be about 25 million, the second largest in the world, ranging from a mere 20 in Albania to over 2.2 million in the United States, dispersed in 136 countries.

The efforts of PM Modi regarding Diaspora Diplomacy and in cultivating the relationship with Indian diaspora signifies the importance of soft power in the foreign policy initiatives of the present government. To be fair, diaspora cultivation is not exactly a new phenomenon in IFP; the former governments had also invested a good amount of capital in resolving the underlying obstacles in the implementation of effective interaction between Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) with the Indian government.  

The union government in the year 2000 established a high-level committee on Indian diaspora to review the status of People of Indian Origin (PIOs) and Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) looking at the laws and rules that are applicable to them. This was an initiative to look at the role NRIs and PIOs may play in the social, economic and technological development of India.  Better rules favouring the PIOs like the ease of travel and stay were implemented and new categories created amongst its diaspora in 2006 for the NRIs, PIOs and Overseas Citizen of India (OCIs). The Indian parliament in August 2005, passed the amendment of Citizenship Act of 1955, allowing certain sections of the diaspora to gain specific citizenship rights. Eventually, there is a growth in outreach activities for the Indian diaspora like conferences and seminars, Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (Day of Indians Abroad) amongst other initiatives which show a concerted effort by the Government of India to showcase India as a place that is welcoming of its diaspora.

Diasporas: Effective Instrument in India’s Foreign Policy

The importance of diasporas does not end with remittances alone. It extends to knowledge transfer, the sharing of resources, diasporas acting as unofficial Indian ambassadors and pushing for India’s interests abroad. The diaspora has also helped in improving India’s image globally and they undoubtedly have considerable stakes in India’s development.

Diaspora is the oxygen to PM Modi’s foreign policy. Since day one, he has addressed concerns related to the Indian diaspora and makes it a point to address a gathering of Indian diaspora at any foreign visit. The task of such an interaction is to convince the diaspora that they can engage as effective stakeholders in the problems faced by India and that their contribution is imperative for India’s economic development and its rise as a global power. This also acts as a subtle but powerful message to the governments of the host countries. This “Diaspora Diplomacy” is a classic example of how the diaspora can act as an effective instrument of diplomacy in international affairs in the era of globalisation. The diaspora can greatly contribute to domestic economic development and attract FDI to India. Modi’s idea of diaspora diplomacy is to ensure a collective Indian voice in the host countries where they are simultaneously loyal citizens. While the diaspora certainly do not determine policy, they can effectively shape it and act as “bridge-builders” between their home and host countries.

While looking at the effect of diaspora Diplomacy in Indian Foreign Policy, some examples can be cited as diaspora plays a decisive role in the improvement of India’s foreign relations. Historically, India has benefitted from its diaspora. Two instances stand out: lobbying for the US-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement Bill in 2008 and their remittance inflow. The Indo-American community had a significant role to play in improving the image of Indians in the American minds as well as the Indo-US rapprochement. The lobbying efforts of the US India Political Action Committee (USINPAC) helped to get the Indo-US Nuclear Deal passed by the US Congress. While Bollywood films since Independence have enjoyed great popularity in the Middle East, the development of geo-economics has made the Indian diaspora as an important instrument, interest and indicator of India’s soft power in the region. The Indian expats working in the region contribute significantly to the remittances India receives. PM Modi has capitalised on the need for Middle Eastern countries to look for large markets because of the Shale Revolution and US Retrenchment, increasing India’s engagement with the region. The most important tool for PM Modi’s Middle East adventures has been the Indian diaspora.

However, certain political developments taking place within India do sometimes negatively impact the diaspora, for example, the negative impact of the diaspora is that there are also groups and individuals within the diaspora who continue to support various insurgent groups operating within India, while lending them both moral and material support through hawala operations, money laundering etc. and this can prove to be a colossal security threat for the nation.

Nevertheless, India has a pivotal role to play in world affairs as it is a rising power and a key stakeholder in the security dynamics of South Asia and Southeast Asia. Its role in East Asia is taking shape and while India is still not an economic power, its military capabilities, shared interests and willingness to explore beyond its rhetoric have raised expectations banking on its capabilities and the role India can play as an Asian power, in the region and globally. The large populations of Indian expatriates in countries like Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia provide India with an opportunity to develop nurturing and more cooperative relations in the region. In the past, diaspora policies have been inconsistent and often poorly implemented, to say in the least. Over the years, however, the diaspora populations have become an increasingly important factor in international relations and politics. The Indian diaspora have a direct engagement and influence on the economies and polities of both the origin country and the host country. This provides for a ripe environment for India to tap on the potential they offer.

Conclusion

However, the present foreign-policy strategy of a strong outreach to the Indian diaspora stands out and must be nurtured. The diaspora can provide the requisite strategic impulse and strengthen strategic relations.  In the present times, the global reach of media and revolutionary changes in communication has helped create diaspora networks and instant connectivity with the motherland. It is important to constantly engage the diaspora and develop policies as the destinies of India and the diaspora are intertwined. Therefore, it serves the interest of both to develop a mutually beneficial relationship and is an important tool for India’s soft power diplomacy which would help India in achieving its aspirations to be a developed country and a knowledge superpower in the international arena.

References

Chaudhury, D. R., & Duttagupta, I. (2020). India steps up Gulf diplomacy for its diaspora. The Economic Times.

Haider, S. (2020). The ambit and the limits of ‘diaspora diplomacy’. The Hindu.

Ok, Y. E. (2018). “DIASPORA DIPLOMACY” AS A FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY. IFAIR.

Rana, K. S. (2009). India’s Diaspora Diplomacy. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy.

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While it has been regarded as a continuum of economic and developmental prospects for Pakistan, it has also, significantly, given birth to a series of domestic economic and political issues in Pakistan. It is an instrument whereby China seeks to establish its hegemony through the combined use of hard and soft power, relying greatly on its “debt-trap diplomacy”. The debt outcome of the CPEC project is already about $80 billion, with 90% of it to be paid for by Islamabad in the form of the national debt. Even though Islamabad is still presenting a rosy picture of CPEC and its developmental prospects for Pakistan, it is well known that it will not be able to pay China back and will eventually lose its sovereignty and become another linchpin in the Chinese debt trap strategy. Experts and media reports have already been referring to it as a “Trillion Dollar Blunder”.

This mega billion dollar project has turned out to be more of a Non-Performing Asset (NPA) for China than a boon, especially when the world has been badly hit by the pandemic. The CPEC has proven to be more of a bogus project that hardly offers any profits with lagging industrialisation efforts and only a quarter of the decided projects completed over the last five years. With China facing an economic slowdown and depleting dollar reserves, it is itself in desperate need of the USD and is trying to woo foreign investors to its financial markets. With the trade war with the US and the Chinese export market facing an all-time low due to the diplomatic distancing and the Western countries’ ire over China’s role in the spread of Coronavirus pandemic, a big blow has been landed on to the Belt and Road Initiative, especially the CPEC project that is greatly faltering and has turned out to be China’s biggest NPA. With the global supply chains being badly hit, the OBOR Initiative is no longer a marker of China’s long-term vision and magnanimity; rather it is regarded as an investment blunder of colossal scale. The CPEC, which sowed dreams of a developed Pakistan with the most profitable and developed infrastructure has and the region into a hub of trade and commerce has instead turned it into a centre of gargantuan infrastructure with negative profitability and zero utility. The Chinese banks and financial institutions have been shirking away from funding the CPEC, as it is evidently nil on profit, given Pakistan’s inability to repay the Chinese loans. 

There is a huge gap in the announced projects of 2015 and completed projects of 2020, with only 32 of the 122 announced projects seeing the light of the day. The CPEC project is lagging behind as it has been facing many shortcomings like lack of funds, trade asymmetries, domestic issues, bad loans for China which does not want to fund the CPEC projects and opposition from Baloch rebels and local who will be directly impacted by this rollout. Large energy projects have been shelved as this NPA faces major bottlenecks due to unsustainable debt levels. China is reluctant to provide assistance as the venture does not provide any returns and is a fund drain. Moreover, Pakistan’s long standing challenges have been aggravated by the CPEC; it entails economic, environmental, social and political costs the state which faces an exacerbated energy deficit, creating a greater dependence for fossil fuels that are harming the environment as well. The CPEC was roped in on its premise of turning Pakistan into a higher-value manufacturing hub, however, what is seen at present is that the huge majority of special economic zones (SEZs) are empty, and the information and communication technology (ICT) projects that were to provide the backbone have been halted and limited. 

Conclusion

Thus, the CPEC is a gamble for China and Pakistan, contrary to their narrative of completing the CPEC at all means. It has already increased Pakistan’s current account deficit and China does not want to invest more where there is no way of recouping their investment and the Return of Investment (RoI) rate shows a gloomy picture. For the Dragon, given the calamitous economic situation Pakistan is in, even the chances of recovery of principal amounts spent by the Chinese financial institutions is a far-fetched dream and thus, the “iron-brotherhood” may be in a jeopardy. The Chinese funds kept Pakistan afloat and prevented it from sinking into the economic doom, however with the funds getting halted and dried up, CPEC faces cost escalations being beneficial for none. Rather than an asset, it has become a liability and has been added to the list of China’s NPA.

References: 

Chinese banks’ reluctance towards CPEC hint towards their funding gap. (2020, August 27). Wion .

Afzal, M. (2020). “At all costs”: How Pakistan and China control the narrative on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Brookings.

Business Standard . (2018, April 17). Pak’s current account deficit rises due to CPEC: ADB report. Business Standard.

Hillman, J. E., McCalpin, M., & Brock, K. (2020). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor at Five. CSIS.

The EurAsian Times. (2020, July 4). CPEC Project A ‘Trillion-Dollar Blunder’, Pakistan Calls It ‘Outstanding Initiative’. The EurAsian Times.

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Why and How are Drugs Reaching Kashmir?

With China and Pakistan axis at an all-time high, Pakistan has been stronger than before and has been using a variety of tactics to fund its terrorist activities in Kashmir by providing funds, assistance and substance abuse. The Sino-Pak Nexus is greatly dependent on the Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir (PoK) region and they have been using the region as a linchpin for stymieing India’s growth and fomenting issues in its Achilles Heel. Drug smuggling, thus, has become a great cause of concern in the Union Territory, creating security threats and weakening the International Border. Afghanistan and Pakistan have had a huge role to play in the on-goings in the region, as the former supplies drugs and well as men, material and training and their militant networks are strong enough to penetrate India’s borders through North Kashmir that has been lapped up by the persistent drug addiction and abuse and brainwashing. Moreover, post the abrogation of Article 370 in the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan has been strongly engaged in giving a fillip to the drug sponsored terrorism in Kashmir with help from Afghanistan, mostly through good quality heroin that is then sent to various parts of the country through their associates based in those areas.

Obscured among regular merchandise or in secret niches, these narcotics are sent from the drug corridor in North Kashmir to Punjab, Gujarat, Mumbai and Rajasthan in transportation trucks and vehicles. The cross-border drug menace has spread its tentacles far and wide in India, with drugs also making their way into Kashmir through Gujarat via sea route from Pakistan, in trucks carrying products from mountain salt to cumin seeds and apples.

Prior to Indian Government’s 2019 order for suspension of the cross border trade that took place via the LoC, the drug mafia was active through this route. Heroin has been found in consignments of dress material in Uri and hawai chappals that were later dumped in Lal Chowk area of Srinagar.

Landmark Case Study: Attari Border (2019)

The heroin haul in a Pakistani truck at the Attari border in Amritsar on June 26, 2019 by the Customs Officials, is a landmark event to show how narco-terrorism became well-embedded in the fabric of Kashmir. The truck driver had unloaded six hundred bags of pink salt which seemed suspicious to the officials and after investigation, it turned out to be 15 bags containing 532 kilograms of heroin worth Rs 2000 crores. The case was handed over to the National Investigation Agency (NIA) which found out that there was huge involvement across the border, from Afghanistan and Pakistan, in the narcotics racket; the profits from the scandal being used for funding the terror module in Kashmir. The NIA found linkages between Amritsar-based businessman, Gurpinder Singh for whom the consignment was apparently meant and a Kashmiri man, Tariq Lone who had linkages with the Noor and Noor Company based in Pakistan. From various interrogations, what came to light was that the drug cartel passed through various channels through Afghanistan-Pakistan and Kashmir. Loads of packages of other goods and mundane consignments prior to this recovery must have contained these shipments of heroin, according to the investigating authorities who discovered an ostentatious network of hawala operators helping the narcotics lobby. The huge network had linkages to Dubai and Kashmiris who had crossed over to Pakistan to become terrorists.

The Inside Story: A Look Into Other Case Studies

The persistent issue of drug abuse in Kashmir again came to limelight on the fateful evening of June 11, 2020 when the police personnel in Handwara town in North Kashmir stopped a car sans a registration plate. The passenger seat of the car had a black coloured bag safely tucked under it, which on further investigation contained over six kilograms of heroin and twenty lakhs in cash. The occupant of the seat was identified as Abdul Momin Peer and subsequent raids point out that the drug syndicate spans his entire family. His father-in-law, Ifthikar Andrabi and brother were arrested in successive raids, with 21 kilograms heroin and Rs 1 crore cash recovered from various properties in the family’s name. The seized drugs are estimated to be worth Rs 100 Crores. The story of poppy and guns of Kashmir was transferred to the NIA who found that Peer’s father-in-law has a number of relatives across the LoC in Pakistan occupied Jammu and Kashmir, close to North Kashmir (Handwara region). It has been established by the agencies that they have links with the terrorist outfit, Lashkar-e-Toiba through which the high-level narcotic consignments have been sourced by the family from the Afg-Pak belt and then sent to other states in India from Kashmir, hereby, the profits of the narco-trade being used for furthering terrorism in the valley.

The profits of a recent drug consignment of Rs 5 crores to Amritsar wherein more than three crores were distributed among the ground workers in the valley and the terrorists of Lashkar-e-Toiba has been an important case study of the investigation of this drug scandal. According to the intelligence agencies, this is just the tip of the iceberg of the J&K especially North Kashmir’s drug romance and its narco-terrorism. The rampant drug trade has been a major source of funding to the terrorism in Kashmir as the recent cases have highlighted and outfits like Lashkar-e-Toiba Jaish-e-Mohammed, the Hizbul Mujahideen operating in the valley have been seen to be greatly involved in this narco-terrorism tête-à-tête. With further investigations and newer facts being unearthed, the NIA found another key player in the drug peddling from Hyderpora, Kashmir: Afaq Ahmad Wani from whom they recovered Rs 30 lakhs in cash and three kilos of heroin. Interestingly, the accused is a bank manager by profession.

Conclusion

As evident from the various interrogations and recoveries made by the investigation agencies, North Kashmir has, hence, become a safe haven for the terrorist outfits and the narco-terrorism is on its peak in the region, the profits from the drug consortia providing the basis for the development and deepening of the terrorist activities and associations in the valley. Moreover, the issue does not end here as the drug peril is spreading its roots in various parts of India, creating an appalling security threat for the state. The drug issue has extremely dark undertones to it and the need is for a coordinated and strategic approach by the authorities and government, to stem the issues at the ground level.  

References:

Ahuja, N. B. (2020, July 18). Cross border narco-terror becoming a major concern for India. THE WEEK. https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2020/07/18/cross-border-narco-terror-becoming-a-major-concern-for-india.html

Hussain, A. (2020, June 27). ‘Narco-terror’ module busted in Kashmir, 2 held with Rs 65 crore narcotics and weapons. Hindustan Times, Srinagar.

Pandita, R. (2020, September 11). Guns and Poppy. OPEN, pp. 26-31.

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